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ABSTRACT
With the development of data transactions, data security issues have become increasingly important. For
example, the copyright authentication and provenance of data have become the primary requirements for
data security defence mechanisms. For this purpose, this paper proposes a data provenance system with
retention of reference relations (called RRDP), which can enhance the security of data service in the
process of publishing and transmission. The system model for data provenance with retention of reference
relations adds virtual primary keys using reference relations between data tables. Traditional provenance
algorithms have limitations on data types. This model has no such limitations. Added primary key is auto-
incrementing integer number. Multi-level encryption is performed on the data watermarking to ensure the
secure distribution of data. The experimental results show that the data provenance system with retention of
reference relations has good accuracy and robustness of the provenance about common database attacks.
INDEX TERMS Data provenance; reference relations; primary foreign key; database watermarking
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, the development of social media informa-tion and networking has led to explosive growth of data
service. Data transactions [1] are growing with the genera-
tion, exchange, management and application of data streams.
As the volume of data transactions increases, the security
issues become prominent. In this case, Trusted Computing
(TC) is a good solution. Trusted Computing is the concept
of adding trust to the information society. This technology
can enhance the overall security, privacy and trustworthiness
of various computing devices, build trusting society, and im-
prove the level of information security. There are also many
other existing protection measures under the data sharing
environment [2]. A directly revocable attribute-based encryp-
tion scheme (ABE) [3] and a revocable IBE (identity-based
encryption) scheme [4] are proposed to protect the secure
storage of data in cloud environments. Fan [5] has studied the
effect of transmit power allocation among jammer on security
performance. Cao [6] proposes a novel coverless information
hiding method based on MSIM(molecular structure images
of material) to guarantee the security of information trans-
mission. Encrypted transmission based security scheme in
IoT is studied by Jhaveri [7] and Wang [8]. The operational
scheme of functional Android malware detection [9], [10] is
also getting more and more attention.
Data service can be vulnerable to malicious dissemination
in the process of circulation. Once the transaction data is ille-
gally stolen, leaked, or tampered, it may pose a serious threat
to the security of involved individuals or enterprises [11]–
[13]. With the rapid development of emerging technologies,
such as the Internet of Things (IoT), artificial intelligence,
cloud and fog computing, new challenges have raised for
the secure transmission of data. Traditional TC technology is
not enough to meet current security needs. People’s online
behavior or digital footprints can be recorded by the data
transaction platform, such as data consumption habits or
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friends networking information, etc. Once the data is leaked
or stolen in the process of the circulation, not only will it
cause a certain degree of damage to the user, but will also
infringe the copyright of the data in the trading platform
[14]. Therefore, how to trace the source and locate the leaker
quickly after data loss is important to ensure the security of
data service [15]. Data provenance technology is an effective
measure to solve this problem.
A. DATA PROVENANCE
Data provenance is a technique with traceability, which can
reproduce the historical state and evolution of data based on
tracing paths. Previous research on provenance has focused
only on database systems [16], [17], file systems [18], work-
flow systems [19]–[22] , and operating systems [23]. This
paper focuses on the data provenance technology in database
system.
Normal methods. Early provenance techniques mainly
include annotation method [24] and query inversion method
[25], the annotation method could record the relevant in-
formation to achieve the historical state of the data. Since
the annotation method is not suitable for fine-grained data,
especially the data provenance in big data. Fan [25] proposes
a reverse query method, which inverts the query by reverse
query or constructing a reverse function . This method should
be calculated when needed, so it is called the lazzy method.
Alawini [26] mainly shows the connection between data
citation and data provenance.
Typical methods for database. Database fingerprint tech-
nology can also effectively solve the problem of provenance.
Most database fingerprinting techniques are designed based
on database watermarking techniques. Li et al. [27] proposes
a fingerprint relation database extraction technique. In [28],
a new fingerprint structure NoFiA is proposed to protect the
relational data in the database system from illegal copying
and redistribution. In [29], an availability constraint is pro-
posed for the fingerprint relational database. The declara-
tive language defines an availability-constrained digital wa-
termark and fingerprint relational database. They optimize
watermark embedding through search. Liang [30] proposes a
decentralized and trusted cloud data provenance architecture
by blockchain. Fernanda presents the progger (provenance
logger), a kernel-space logger which potentially empowered
a cloud stakeholders to trace their data.
After referring to the relevant literatures of various existing
data provenance techniques, we find that there are still many
problems in the existing technical solutions.
• Large storage requirement. Although the early data
provenance methods [31]–[33] are easy to implemen-
t and manage, it is only suitable for small systems.
However, it is difficult to provide detailed traceability
information for the large systems. Additional storage
space is required to store the tag information. These
methods are less efficient and have some limitations.
• Rely on data type. The data provenance methods using
database watermarking technology [34]–[37] have great
limitations on data types. These current methods mainly
focus on numerical data. Gupta’s DEW technique [38]
and Farfoura’s PE-1 technique [39] introduces the dif-
ferential extension, which could achieve the reversibil-
ity of the watermark embedding process. This method
could ensure the availability of data to the utmost extent.
However, it embeds watermark information by changing
its redundant bits. The data types are more diverse in
practical applications, and it is difficult to find effective
redundant space without destroying the integrity of data
and its reference relations.
• Weak robustness. The existing data provenance tech-
niques [40] are suitable for specific application sce-
narios. Jawad’s GADEW technique [41] is based on
the idea of difference expansion and utilizes genetic
algorithm (GA) to improve watermark capacity and to
reduce distortion. But its robustness under the alteration
attacks and deletion attacks is not very good. There
is no single solution can defend against most attacks.
In practice, a combination of multiple watermarking
algorithms is generally used to resist more attacks.
Each technique has its own benefits, drawbacks, issues and
limitations. There is no better way to solve all of the above
problems effectively.
B. MOTIVATION
This paper found two important rules: (1) Tables are asso-
ciated by primary foreign keys, which are usually not valid
data, but auxiliary data. (2) In the previous database relations
(tuple), the value of one column is closely related to the
value of other columns. In general, some transformations will
destroy their relevance. As a result, many algorithms cannot
be applied.
Based on the above rules, we change the primary foreign
key without changing the data reference relations between
the tables, then we can apply a certain implicit rule as the
embedded watermark information on the generated primary
foreign key to preserve the original state of data. Once the
data is leaked, the source of the data leak can be traced by the
extracted watermark. This solution can be implemented both
on static datasets and dynamic datasets.
There are three goals: 1)Find effective redundant space
in the database; 2) Embed watermark information without
affecting the use of data; 3) Trace the source efficiently after
data leakage. The study found that the primary foreign key
has many advantages, it can be used to meet all the basic
requirements mentioned above: 1) Position of embedding
watermark is more flexible, we can dynamically add the pri-
mary foreign key value without too much extra storage space,
this method effectively solves the problem of large amount
of data storage in current data provenance technology. It is
not only suitable for small systems, but also conforms to the
background of today’s big data; 2) The scheme uses table
structure transformation to imply some certain rules as the
watermark information, which could break through the limi-
tations of data types in traditional provenance techniques; 3)
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TABLE 1: Comparison between RRDP and previous scheme
Scheme Elapsed time overheads Robustness Data typeEmbed Detect Alteration attack Insertion attack Deletion attack Numeric Non-numeric
Previous work
Gupta [38] O(n) O(n) medium medium higher X ×
Jawad [41] O(n) O(n) low low medium X ×
Farfoura [39] O(n) O(n) high high higher X ×
This work
RRDP O(n) O(logn) higher higher higher X X
Due to the association of the primary foreign key, the attacker
generally doesn’t destroy the primary foreign key between
the tables, so it can resist various database attack types, such
as alteration attacks, insertion attacks, and deletion attacks.
Compared to the previous schemes, this scheme has better
robustness.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTION
We compare the RRDP with several typical database wa-
termark schemes in terms of time overhead, robustness and
data type. Table 1 summarizes the comparison of the RRDP
scheme with the previous schemes.
In the comparison of the time consumption of the above
schemes, we don’t consider the distribution of multi-level
and multi-objects, we mainly analyzes the complexity of
data embedding watermark and detecting watermark. The
time complexity of embedding watermark in our scheme
is O(n). When performing watermark detection, the RRDP
scheme doesn’t need to verify all the tuples, so we think
that the computational complexity is about O(log n), which is
smaller than the minimum value of all the above algorithms
O(n); In terms of the robustness of the algorithm, we mainly
analyze the resilience of alteration attacks, insertion attacks
and deletion attacks. It is found that only the RRDP scheme
can effectively resist these three types of attacks; For data
types, the previous watermarking algorithms mostly rely on
data types, but the RRDP algorithm is suitable for various
data types.
In this paper, a data provenance algorithm with retention
of reference relations is proposed. The main contributions of
this paper are as follows:
• Our proposed algorithm doesn’t require a lot of extra
space when embedding and storing traceability infor-
mation. The algorithm is not only suitable for small
systems, but also for today’s big data background.
• The generation rules of the primary foreign key is used
to embed the watermark information without changing
the original data. Therefore, we don’t need to consider
the specific data type, which breaks the limitation of the
general database watermarking algorithm on data type
processing.
• Our data provenance scheme can resist most common
database attack types, such as alteration attacks, inser-
tion attacks and deletion attacks, so it has good robust-
ness.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. NOTATIONS
Throughout this paper, the notation DO,DP ,DU denote the
original data owner, watermark processor and data user
respectively. Other parameters include:
-A is the original database.
-The set {am1 , am2 , ..., ami }, {bm1 , bm2 , ..., bmj }, {cm1 , cm2 , ..., cmk }
denote the different split-tables which are distributed to the
different m-level data users.
-i, j and k denote the number of the split-tables respectively
( i 6= j 6= k).
-The set {x′1, x′2, ..., x′t} denotes the leaked tables.
-Ki denotes the key corresponding to different data users.
-The set {T1, T2, ..., Ti} denotes the 0-1 attribute tables.
-T ′ denotes the leaked 0-1 attribute table.
-P denotes the original auto-incremented integer column.
-Pe denotes the encrypted auto-incremented integer column.
-Pes denotes the auto-incremented integer column after
sorting Pe.
Definition 1. (0-1 attribute table). This 0-1 attribute table
describes the attributes owned by each of the split tables. The
header row is the name of all the attributes in the original
table attribute1, attribute2, the header column is the name
of each table after split {a1, a2, ...}. If the split table a1 has
attribute2, the data in the corresponding table is 1, otherwise
0.
Definition 2. (K-Tree). The hierarchy relations of data
distribution described by this tree structure. The data of the
node in the tree stores the code of each data user {U1, U2, ...},
where the root node represents the owner of the original
data, and the parent of each child node represents the data
distributor of the previous level.
Definition 3. (U-Key table). The table describes the data
user’s name, code name, the corresponding key and 0-1
attribute table.
Definition 4. (3DES). 3DES is a mode of the DES encryp-
tion algorithm which uses three 56-bit keys to encrypt data
three times.
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B. SYSTEM MODEL
The data of the data ownerDO will be collected, transmitted,
processed and stored before being distributed. Data process-
ing unit DP is the core of the model, whose function is to
watermark the data on the premise of storing data users’
information and distribution, and to trace the source of the
data after the data leaks. There are also some other entities in
this system, such as data users DU , including the company
and its subsidiaries.
Figure.1 shows an example of data distribution, theft and
traceability. In the Figure.1, DO gives the original data A to
DP . There are three data users distributed at level 1.
DP performs three different types of splits and changes on
the table structure of A, then we get the processed table set
{a01, a02, ..., a0i }, {b01, b02, ..., b0j}, {c01, c02, ..., c0k}. Each com-
pany’s corresponding key Ki is used to encrypt it, and get
the table set {a11, a12, ..., a1i }, {b11, b12, ..., b1j}, {c11, c12, ..., c1k},
which are distributed separately to data User1, User2 and
User3.
Once DO discovers the data leak, the leaked table set
{x1′, x2′, ..., xt′} is handed over to DP for traceability. DP
compares the 0-1 attribute table T of the leaked table set with
its stored Ti. Then the code of the data user is determined
based on the U-Key table, and the circulation of its distri-
bution data is determined through the position of the code in
the K-Tree. Finally, the traitor is identified by using the key in
the U-Key table to compare the encrypted data and the leaked
data.
C. RRDP
The following algorithm can be used to describe a data
provenance scheme, which is retained based on the reference
relations.
• RRDP. Setup(A): Given a original database A, the
output will be a set of split tables {a01, a02, ..., a0i }.
• RRDP. WMEmb([a],Ki): Given a set of split tables
[x′] and encryption key Ki , the output will be a set of
new tables [a1].
• RRDP. TRPro([x], [a0],Ki): Given the leaked tables
[x′], the original tables [a0] and the encryption key Ki,
the outputs will be the encrypted table [x]. Compare [x]
with [x′] and trace the traitor.
Security model. In this model, some users are considered
curious and malicious. They may disclose all or part of the
records, but they will not maliciously replace or delete all the
primary foreign keys. In general, this model can resist the
common database attacks, such as tuple attacks and attribute
attacks.
III. OUR SCHEME
We will introduce a new data provenance method which
preserves the reference relations. First, the primary foreign
key relations between the tables is changed by the self-
incremented primary key, and a new order is generated using
a key space-based replacement algorithm, which is the wa-
termark information. Once the data is leaked, the leaker can
be verified by continuously encrypting it from the source. We
named it RRDP . This algorithm is aimed at the related data
in the database, it includes three parts: primary foreign key
alter, watermark embedding, tracking and provenance.
A. PRIMARY FOREIGN KEYS ALTER
The primary foreign key change algorithm is described in
Figure 2.DP splits and alters the original data table structure
of DO, and adds or replaces its primary foreign key to
each of the split tables, thus forming a new table structure
which retains the reference relations. Different users’ data
will be split into different types of table structures to facilitate
efficient provenance after data leakage.
Input: DO inputs a set of original database tables A of N
tuples.
Output: DP outputs a set of altered-tables [a0].
1. Splitting tables: According to the actual demands, the
tables are divided into two types: single-table and multi-
table. At the same time, for the different distribution units,
the corresponding table can be split into different structures
and number T so that the range can be quickly located when
traced.
a) Single table splitting: The vertical splitting method is
adopted when dealing with a single table. That is, table A
is divided into different database tables [a0] according to its
modules and functions without destroying the third normal
form.
b) Multi-table splitting: When there is no primary foreign
key association or weak correlation between multiple tables,
we use the single table split method in (a) to split multiple
tables.
2. Primary-foreign key alter: The structure of the
database table [a0] is changed. Add a sequentially increasing
integer column P as the self-incrementing primary key while
retaining the primary key of the table a01. Then the foreign
key of the table [a0] is replaced by the integer primary key
added in the table a01, in order to retain the primary foreign
key relations between the tables.
3. Storing the 0-1 attribute table: Store the situation of
attribute existence by each split table as a 0-1 table. The
header row is the name of all the attributes in the original
table {atteibute1, attribute2, ...}. The header column is the
name of each table after the split {a1, a2, ...}. If the split table
a1 has attribute2, the data in the corresponding table is 1,
otherwise 0.
A = {Name, passeword, telephone, email, address}
is a table in the original database. It is split in-
to a1 = {Name, password, email} and a2 =
{Name, telephone, address} as the above-mentioned step-
s; Then change the structure of the two tables after the
split, the sequentially incremented ID integer column P =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is added as the self-incrementing primary key
while retaining the primary key Name of the table a1. Next,
replace the foreign key Name in table a2 with the ID integer
column P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} which is added in table a1. Table
2 is the corresponding 0-1 attribute table we stored.
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A User4
User5(Traitor)
User1
User2
User3
Encrypting circularly and Locating the traitor
Table split
... ...
FIGURE 1: Example of data distribution, theft and traceability
TABLE 2: a1, a2 0-1 attribute table
T1 Name Password Telephone Email Address
a1 1 1 0 1 0
a2 0 0 1 0 1
B. WATERMARK EMBEDDING
This watermark embedding algorithm is described in Figure
1 . It is divided into two steps: key generation and storage and
key space-based replacement.
Input: DP inputs a set of altered-tables [a0] of N tuples,
encryption key . Ki
Output: DP outputs a set of watermarked-tables [a1].
1. Key generation and storage: Map the string of DU
names as a key Ki before the data publishing. The number
of unit Ui and the key Ki are stored in the U-Key table
one-to-one, and Ui is stored in the K-Tree according to the
hierarchical relations of the distribution.
2. Key space-based replacement: The key space-based
permutation algorithm (k, 0...N) is used to rearranged the
tuples and distribute the rearranged data to the affiliate.
a) According to the key Ki, the basic block cipher E (eg,
3DES,AES, etc.) is used to encrypt the self-incrementing
integer column P = {p1, p2, ..., pm}. Which calculates the
tuple I = (Ek(p1), Ek(p2), ..., Ek(pm));
b) Each component Ek(i) ∈ I is a different binary string
whose length depend on the packet size, and it is sorted
according to the numerical relations. Then obtain the sort
value ri corresponding to Ek(i), replace the component
Ek(i) with its corresponding sort value and get the integer
column Pe = (p1′, p2′, ..., pm′);
c) The tuples in table are rearranged in the ascending order
of the encrypted integer column Pe = (p1′, p2′, ..., pm′) to
obtain a rearranged table.
TABLE 3: U-Key table
User name User code Key TN
User1 U1(1) K1(A) T1
User2 U2(2) K2(B) T2
User3 U3(3) K3(C) T3
User4 U4(4) K4(D) T4
User5 U5(5) K5(E) T5
Select 3DES as the basic block cipher E, the key
is k1(A). In order to facilitate subsequent cryptographic
operations, we take the simplest self-incrementing integer
column of number 5. Then we encrypt the ID integer column
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} according to the key k1(A), calculateEk1(1) =
5753214040127886486; Ek1(2) = 3011020924204599246;
Ek1(3) = 0450904572176669844;Ek1(4) = 745368965694
4979882; Ek1(5) = 6219725333994694406 to obtain the
tuple I = (Ek(p1), Ek(p2), ..., Ek(pm)). They are sorted
according to the numerical relations, thus we get the en-
crypted sequence Pe = {3, 2, 1, 5, 4}. Reorder the tuples in
the table by the ascending order of the encrypted ID integer
column Pe = {3, 2, 1, 5, 4}, the mapping relations between
the self-increase integer column P in the original table and
the encrypted integer column Pe is the embedded watermark
information. Further, DP stores the unit number U1 of User1
and the key K1(A) in the U-Key table, and it also stores U1
in the K-Tree according to the hierarchy of its distribution
(U0 represents the data owner DO). As shown in Figure 2,
according to the same processing method as above, the data
is distributed to User2, ..., User5, then the U-Key table(Table
3) and K-Tree (Figure. 2) is described as follows.
C. TRACKING AND PROVENANCE PHASE
Once the data is leaked, the original data is encrypted contin-
uously by the key space-based replacement algorithm and the
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...
...
0U
1U 2U 3U
4U 5U
FIGURE 2: K-Tree
...
...
0U
1U 2U 3U
4U 5U
FIGURE 3: K-Tree (Leak path)
information stored by DP , and then the encrypted sequence
is compared with the sequence of the leaked data. Finally the
leaker is found.
Input: DP inputs a set of leaked-tables [x′], original data
tables [a0], U-Key table, K-Tree, 0-1 attribute table.
Output: DP outputs the code of traitor Ui.
1. Comparing the attributes: Extract the attributes’ sit-
uation of the leakage table [x′], compare it with the 0-1
attribute table stored by DP , then Ti is determined, the
branch structure Tb where the data in the K-Tree is located
is obtained by querying the U-Key table.
2. Encryption and tracking: The U-Key table is queried
to obtain all Ti of Tb According to Tb. Then, the distribution
path in Tb is simulated by the encryption algorithm in 3.2,
and the original table [a0] is encrypted multiple times using
the involved Ki.
3. Verification and positioning: Compare each encrypted
table [ai] with the leaked table [x′]. After the comparison is
successful, determine the code of traitor Ui according to the
U-Key table.
Assume DO finds a leaked database table [x′] as
x1 = {Name, password}, x2 = {email} and x3 =
{telephone, address}. The corresponding 0-1 attribute table
obtained by [x′] is shown in Table 3. Compare Tx with the 0-1
attribute table stored by DP , then we get x = 2.
By querying the U-Key table, all Ki={K2(B),K4(D),
K5(E)} in the branch structure Tb where the data in the K-
Tree is located (the bold line in Figure.3) is obtained. Then
all the data leakage path is known by Tb: 1© User2; 2©
User2→ User4; 3©User2→ User5. The key space-based
replacement algorithm and Ki is used to perform encryption
comparison according to the above three paths, and locate the
traitor User4 at last.
D. ANALYSIS OF RRDP
In this section, the RRDP algorithm will be analyzed from
three aspects: algorithm efficiency, accuracy and security.
1. Efficiency analysis.
In order to meet the needs of today’s big data, provenance
algorithms must ensure higher efficiency to reduce the time
consumption and cost requirements. For the RRDP algorith-
m, we mainly consider its computational complexity for first-
level distribution and multi-level distribution.
a) First-level distribution
For the first-level distribution, the encrypted data should
be compared with the leaked data. At this time, the com-
putational complexity of the provenance is O(n). However,
in the actual provenance process, our scheme doesn’t need
to compare all the tuples, only 0.1% of the total number of
tuples could ensure the accuracy of provenance. Therefore,
the computational complexity of the provenance process of
RRDP is smaller than O(n).
b) Multi-level distribution
For the multi-level distribution, in order to quickly deter-
mine the leaked branch, this scheme first introduced the 0-1
attribute table. We store the 0-1 attribute table of each user in
the U-key table. The data distribution path is stored as K-Tree
in the form of a multi-way tree. Once the data leaks, the 0-1
attribute of the leaked data is first extracted and compared
to the 0-1 attribute table we stored. Then we can quickly
locate the leaked branch in K-Tree. This algorithm makes the
previous traversal of the entire tree pair into a traversal of a
subtree, which greatly reduces the computational complexity
of provenance.
2. Accuracy analysis
For provenance algorithms, accuracy is an important met-
ric to measure performance. For the RRDP algorithm, it
uses the primary foreign key association between the tables
instead of the original data values to embed the watermark
information, and it does not require additional storage space.
Therefore, no matter how the amount of data grows, as long
as the corresponding relationship between several rearranged
primary foreign keys in the leakage table and the remaining
tuples is verified at the phase of provenance, it can be
determined whether it is the traitor. The common operation
in the database does not affect the accuracy of the algorithm
at all. The accuracy of this algorithm has always been at a
high standard.
3. Security analysis.
The RRDP scheme uses the encryption of the primary
foreign key to embed the watermark information. When an
attacker maliciously deletes all primary keys, it will affect the
correlation between data, thereby destroying the use of data.
Therefore, in the above security model, we assume that the
attacker doesn’t maliciously delete or change all the primary
foreign keys. Then, we analyze the ability of the algorithm to
defend against three common database attacks as follows.
a) Alteration attacks and insertion attacks
Generally, alteration attacks and insertion attacks will not
change the mapping relations between the primary foreign
key and the other attributes. Therefore, inserting or changing
any tuples does not affect the embedded watermark informa-
tion.
6 VOLUME 4, 2016
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2876879, IEEE Access
Author et al.: Preparation of Papers for IEEE TRANSACTIONS and JOURNALS
b) Deletion attacks
Although the deletion attacks delete part of the data and
the primary foreign key, the reference relations between the
primary foreign key and the attribute of the remaining data
can still be traced. Only 0.1% of the tuples could trace the
traitor. Therefore, the algorithm can also effectively defend
against deletion attacks.
By analyzing the resilience of the algorithm under the three
common database attacks, this RRDP scheme presents better
robustness.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Considering that the algorithm is mainly applicable to data
provenance in the database. In this section, the encryption
time and database processing time is verified. In general, the
database often suffer from some attacks. In order to ensure
that the algorithm can still trace the source accurately under
database attacks, the robustness of the watermark information
under the external attacks also needs to be verified. In this
experiment, we mainly consider alteration attacks, insertion
attacks and deletion attacks.
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
In this section, performance evaluation is provided for
the proposed data provenance algorithm. To test the va-
lidity and robustness of this algorithm, we perform ex-
periments on a computer running Windows 10 Profes-
sional with 3.6 GHz CPU and 8GB RAM. We apply
our algorithms to the real dataset, available from http-
s://www.kaggle.com/donorschoose/io/data, This dataset con-
tains 72,994 tuples and 9 attributes. We select 10,000 tu-
ples of them. Algorithms are implemented on Visual Studio
Platform version 2015 using mysql’s API for C++ to visit
MYSQL database.
B. DATA PUBLISHING EFFICIENCY
We measure the time of data encryption and the time of
database processing. In the experiment shown in Figure.4,
We tested its performance using tuples of size 1000, 10,000
and 100,000. For different size of the tuples, we tested three
times separately and counted its data encryption time and
database processing time.
Figure 4 and 5 show that when the number of tuples is
1000, the histograms of the three colors represent the three
measurements under the same parameters. The average value
of the data encryption time (it refers to the time required for
the self-incrementing primary key to be encrypted by FPE) is
38.67 ms, and the average value of database processing time
is 6681ms. As the number of tuples increases, the encryption
time and database processing time increase linearly.
C. ACCURACY OF PROVENANCE
In order to balance efficiency and accuracy, we set the
similarity threshold γ = 0.1%*N (number of tuples). For
example, when the number of tuples is 10,000, we believe
that the renegade can be determined when the leakage table
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FIGURE 5: Database processing time
is identical to the original processed table with at least 10
data. Table 4 shows the provenance accuracy under different
number of tuples. It can be seen that when the number
of tuples is 1000, 10000, 100000, the provenance accuracy
reaches 100%. When the number of test tuples is 1000000,
the provenance accuracy rate is 98.7%.
TABLE 4: Provenance accuracy rates with different data
sizes
Number of tuples Provenance accuracy rate(%)
1000 100
10000 100
100000 100
1000000 98.7
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with different techniques
D. ROBUSTNESS
Accuracy of provenance is analyzed with alteration, inser-
tion, and deletion attacks for DEW technique [38], GADEW
technique [41], PE-1 technique [39] and our RRDP tech-
nique. The results are shown in Figure 6-8.
From figure 6-8, we can see that our RRDP scheme shows
better robustness under these three common database attacks.
It can be seen from the figure, the provenance accuracy of
RRDP is basically maintained above 97% under the alteration
attacks, when the percentage of the alteration tuples exceeds
60%, the provenance accuracy begins to decrease. Under
the insertion attacks and the deletion attacks, the RRDP’s
provenance accuracy has been maintained at 100%.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a data provenance method with retention of
reference relations is introduced, which is used to track the
leaker and to effectively analyze the responsibilities after
data leakage. Compared with many previous provenance
algorithms, this method doesn’t directly modify the original
data when embedding the watermark information. Instead, it
uses the primary foreign key association between the tables
in the database, and it adds a virtual primary foreign key
to maintain the reference relations between the tables. The
virtual primary key is a list of auto-incrementing integer.
For different users, the system encrypts their virtual primary
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FIGURE 8: Accuracy of provenance with deletion attacks
with different techniques
keys with different keys. In the provenance phase, the system
constantly encrypts the virtual primary key of the original
table structure and compare the data with the leaked data,
then the leaker can be determined and the data leakage path
can be obtained. This system can accurately track leakers
without destroying the usefulness of the data. The system is a
defense against relevant database attacks because of its good
robustness.
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